The Long Shadow
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Chapter 01

The Winner Who Lost

1945–1947  ·  approx. 21 min listen

In the summer of 1945, Britain won the greatest war in its history, and lost something it could not yet name.

Picture the scene. It is the eighth of May, 1945 — VE Day. A million people are in the streets of London. Outside Buckingham Palace, the crowd is so dense that mounted policemen have given up trying to move it. The King and Queen come out onto the balcony again and again — eight times in all — and beside them, in the uniform he has made famous, is Winston Churchill. Searchlights sweep the sky, not hunting bombers this time, just carving the darkness into pieces for the fun of it. Down Whitehall, past the sandbagged ministries, the crowd roars at the great man on the Ministry of Health balcony, and he roars back: "This is your victory!" And the crowd, being British, and being right, shouts back: "No — it's yours!"

It is one of the great moments of British history. It is also, though nobody on that balcony quite knows it yet, the end of something.

Because here is the strange arithmetic of 1945. Britain has been at war longer than any other major power — six years, from the first day to nearly the last. It has survived alone for a whole year against Nazi Germany, a feat that still seems, the longer you stare at the map, faintly impossible. And it has bankrupted itself doing it.

The numbers, when they came, were almost indecent. A quarter of the country's national wealth — gone. Export trade down by two-thirds. Overseas investments sold off by the billion to pay for ships and shells and Spitfires. Debts to India, to Egypt, to half the dominions — fourteen billion dollars' worth. Britain in 1945 was like a man who has thrown a magnificent party to save his house, and wakes up the next morning to find the house saved and the bailiffs at the door.

And the mortgage, so to speak, was now held in Washington.

This is the first thing to understand about Britain's Cold War. Britain entered that conflict not as a rising power but as a falling one — falling with dignity, falling with style, falling with a nuclear weapon and a permanent seat on the Security Council and a worldwide empire it could no longer afford, but falling all the same. The story of the next forty-five years is the story of how a country managed that decline so skilfully that for most of the period, most of the world — and most Britons — barely noticed it was happening. And it is the story of how, again and again, this medium-sized island off the coast of Europe found itself standing at the exact hinge point of world events: in Berlin in 1948, in Korea in 1950, in the intelligence war that ran beneath everything like an underground river, and finally — surprisingly, almost absurdly — in the endgame itself, when a British prime minister became the first Western leader to say of a Soviet general secretary: "We can do business together."

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. It is still 1945, and Britain has a general election.

The result, when it came on the twenty-sixth of July, staggered the world. Churchill — the Churchill, the saviour of 1940 — was thrown out of office in a landslide. The Labour Party of Clement Attlee won a majority of a hundred and forty-six seats. Abroad, there was genuine shock. In Moscow, Stalin had reportedly assumed Churchill would win; the idea that you could lose an election at all was, for him, a somewhat theoretical concept. In Washington, officials scrambled to find out who this Attlee person was.

And who was he? Clement Attlee was perhaps the least Churchillian human being ever to occupy Downing Street. Small, bald, moustached, famously terse — a man of whom it was said that an empty taxi drew up outside Number Ten and Attlee got out. Churchill himself supposedly called him "a modest man, who has much to be modest about," though Churchill denied saying it, perhaps because even he thought it was cruel. The jibe missed the point anyway. Attlee's modesty was a kind of armour. He had been a social worker in the East End, a major in the Great War who had been carried wounded off the beach at Gallipoli, a man who ran meetings like a drill sergeant — agenda, decision, next item, no speeches, no nonsense. Under that grey exterior beat the heart of a genuine radical, and behind him stood a government of extraordinary talent: Ernest Bevin at the Foreign Office, a hulking former trade union boss who had left school at eleven; Stafford Cripps, the ascetic socialist lawyer; Herbert Morrison, the cockney fixer; Aneurin Bevan, the Welsh firebrand who would build the National Health Service.

This government had been elected to build a new Jerusalem — houses, jobs, a health service, a welfare state. It had not been elected to fight a Cold War. Nobody in July 1945 had been elected to fight a Cold War, because in July 1945, the Cold War did not yet officially exist.

But the ingredients were already in the mixing bowl.

Let us set the wider scene, because Britain's story only makes sense inside it.

In the summer of 1945, the Grand Alliance — Britain, America, the Soviet Union — was coming apart at the seams, and the seams had been visible for years. The alliance had always been a marriage of necessity. Stalin and Hitler had been partners once, don't forget; the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 had carved up Poland between them and started the whole war. When Hitler invaded Russia in June 1941, Churchill — the most ferocious anti-communist in British public life, the man who had once wanted to strangle Bolshevism in its cradle — did not hesitate. "If Hitler invaded Hell," he told his private secretary, "I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons."

For four years, the devil's alliance held. But by the time the Allied leaders met at Potsdam in July 1945 — Truman now, not Roosevelt, who had died in April; and halfway through the conference, Attlee, not Churchill, who had gone home to lose an election — the mutual suspicion was thick enough to spread on toast. Truman had a card up his sleeve: the atomic bomb, tested successfully in the New Mexico desert while the conference was in session. He mentioned it to Stalin, casually, at the end of a session. Stalin, who already knew about it from his spies inside the Manhattan Project — including, as we'll see, a German-born physicist working for the British — nodded blandly and said he hoped the Americans would make good use of it against Japan.

The atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on the sixth of August, 1945. Nagasaki followed three days later. Japan surrendered. The Second World War ended.

And almost immediately — this is one of the eerie symmetries of the period — Britain was reminded how quickly its wartime intimacy with America could evaporate. Within a week of the Japanese surrender, President Truman terminated Lend-Lease, the programme that had kept Britain fed and armed since 1941. Terminated it just like that, as the law required, with the war over. Britain was, in the words of the economist John Maynard Keynes, now facing a "financial Dunkirk."

Keynes was sent to Washington to beg. He was one of the most brilliant men of his age, and he hated every minute of it. What he came home with, in December 1945, was a loan: three point seven five billion dollars, at interest, with strings attached — including a requirement to make the pound convertible into dollars within a set period, a requirement that would cause a sterling crisis within two years, just as Keynes predicted. The American negotiators drove a hard bargain; many in Congress saw no reason to underwrite the British Empire. Keynes, exhausted, wrote that he had gone to Washington hoping for a gift and returned with a mortgage. He was dead within five months, worn out at sixty-two.

Hold on to that detail. The story of Britain in the Cold War is, at one level, simply the story of that mortgage: a country trying to remain a world power on an overdraft, constantly negotiating with its creditor, constantly one financial crisis away from humiliation. Every decision in this book — the bomb, the troops on the Rhine, the retreat from empire, the missiles on the East Anglian coast — has a price tag attached, and usually a Washington signature.

But money was only half of it. The other half was fear.

The fear had a geography, and the geography was Germany.

In 1945, Germany lay in ruins — divided into four occupation zones: American, British, French, Soviet. Berlin, a hundred miles inside the Soviet zone, was divided the same way, like a cake cut into quarters inside someone else's kitchen. The arrangement had been agreed at Yalta and Potsdam on the assumption that the Allies would go on cooperating. It was an assumption that would not survive contact with 1946.

For Ernest Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary, the problem of Russia quickly became the problem that swallowed all others. Bevin is one of the great figures of this story, and it is worth pausing on him, because Britain's Cold War policy was, for its crucial first five years, essentially Bevin's policy.

He was a giant of a man — huge head, huge hands, huge appetites. Born illegitimate in Somerset poverty, orphaned young, a farm boy at eleven, a drayman, then a trade union organiser of genius who built the Transport and General Workers' Union into the largest union in the world. He had run Britain's labour supply during the war as Minister of Labour — he was the man who sent the "Bevin Boys" down the mines — and he came to the Foreign Office with no Latin, no diplomacy, no small talk, and two convictions that would shape the world. The first was that Britain must not be pushed around. The second was that the Americans must be brought — begged, cajoled, tricked if necessary — into the permanent defence of Europe.

"I was brought up amongst the common people," he once said, "and I am not going to be dictatorially told what to do by anybody." When officials worried he wasn't reading his briefing papers, he growled that he didn't need to read papers, he could smell a bad one. The Foreign Office grandees who had dreaded his arrival — a trade unionist! at the Foreign Office! — mostly ended up admiring him. His officials found that he remembered everything he was told, that he could reduce a thirty-page memorandum to its operative sentence, and that he was utterly impossible to intimidate.

And what Bevin smelled, in 1945 and 1946, was trouble from the East.

It is important, for honesty's sake, to say that this was not obvious to everyone at the time. The Labour left, in particular, had come into office hoping for friendship with Russia — "Left can speak to Left," went the slogan. Many Labour MPs admired the Soviet experiment; some had visited Moscow in the thirties and come back starry-eyed. The wartime alliance had been drenched in pro-Soviet sentiment — this was the era of the "Uncle Joe" Stalin posters, of cheering crowds at the Royal Albert Hall celebrating the Red Army's twenty-fifth anniversary. The idea of the Soviet Union as an enemy felt, to many decent people, like a betrayal of the boys who had died at Stalingrad.

Bevin did not share this sentiment, and never had. He had fought communists in the trade union movement for twenty years — "one branch at a time," as he put it — and he knew how they operated. As early as the autumn of 1945, he was telling his officials that the Russians were not merely being difficult, they were being expansionist, and that Britain must organise the resistance. Within a year, the rest of the world would catch up with him.

The catching-up took the form of a series of hammer blows, each one falling on the same anvil.

First hammer: Iran. Under wartime agreement, British, American, and Soviet troops were all supposed to leave Iran within six months of the war's end. The British and Americans left. The Soviets stayed, and started sponsoring a separatist puppet state in Azerbaijan, in the north. In March 1946, the dispute went to the new United Nations — the first great crisis of the UN era — and under pressure, the Red Army eventually withdrew. But the lesson was noted in London and Washington: Stalin tested every door to see if it was locked.

Second hammer: the Fulton speech. On the fifth of March, 1946, Winston Churchill — now Leader of the Opposition, travelling in America as a private citizen with the President of the United States sitting pointedly in the front row — stood up at Westminster College in the little town of Fulton, Missouri, and gave the conflict a name.

"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," he said, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent."

The Iron Curtain. It was not a new phrase — it had been used in the theatre, then by Goebbels — but Churchill put it into the bloodstream of history. Behind that curtain, he said, lay not only the capitals of ancient Europe but the peoples of half a continent, subject now to "police governments," their parties and freedoms crushed. And — this was the part that got lost in the outrage — he proposed a remedy: a fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples, a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and the United States, standing together to prevent both war and tyranny.

The reaction was volcanic. Stalin called it a declaration of war and compared Churchill to Hitler. Much of the American press condemned it. The Labour government in London squirmed — Attlee pointedly declined to endorse it, and more than a hundred Labour MPs signed a motion deploring it. But within eighteen months, virtually everything Churchill had said would be orthodox Western policy, and the "special relationship" he had christened would be the central fact of British foreign policy for the rest of the century.

Third hammer: the Long Telegram and the Truman Doctrine. In Washington, a scholarly American diplomat in Moscow named George Kennan had sent home an eight-thousand-word cable — the famous "Long Telegram" — explaining that Soviet hostility was not a misunderstanding that charm could fix; it was baked into the regime's nature, and the only answer was patient, firm containment. The word "containment" would govern American policy for forty years. And in February 1947, the British delivered the telegram that lit the fuse.

It arrived at the State Department on a Friday afternoon, in two notes from the British Embassy. Their message, stripped of diplomatic varnish, was simple: Britain is broke. As of the end of March, we can no longer carry the burden of supporting Greece — where a communist insurgency was tearing the country apart — or Turkey, which was under Soviet pressure over the Dardanelles. If you think the eastern Mediterranean matters, and we believe you do, then it is your burden now.

Dean Acheson, the American Under Secretary of State — a man who will reappear throughout this book — called it Britain's abdication as a great power, and recognised it instantly for what it was: the passing of the torch. On the twelfth of March, 1947, President Truman went before Congress and announced that it must be the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Congress voted four hundred million dollars for Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine was born, and with it, the American century.

Note the sequence. It was Britain that had held the line in the Mediterranean for two years after the war, at a cost it could not afford. It was Britain that said, finally: we can't. And it was that confession of weakness that pulled the United States into the Cold War as a declared, global, permanent commitment. Ernest Bevin had been working toward exactly this. The trick of British diplomacy in these years — and it was a trick, in the best sense — was to convert decline into leverage: to make American power do the work British power could no longer do alone.

And then came the winter.

The winter of 1946 to 1947 was the worst in British memory — the worst since records began, some said. Snow fell in November and the country stayed frozen until March. Coal could not move on frozen railways and blocked roads; power stations ran out of fuel; factories closed; the electricity went off for hours a day, and this in a country already on rations tighter than during the war. Bread — which had never been rationed even during the Blitz — was rationed now. Britain in early 1947, the winter the Cold War began in earnest, was a grey, shivering, threadbare country where the lights kept going out.

It was out of that winter that the next great decision came. In June 1947, the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, stood up at Harvard and offered Europe something extraordinary: money — billions of dollars of it — to rebuild, if the Europeans would only organise themselves to receive it together. The offer was open to all Europe, including Russia. It was Ernest Bevin who grasped it fastest. He heard the speech on the BBC, called it "a lifeline to sinking men," and moved with a speed that astonished Washington — within three weeks he had the French foreign minister in London, and the Europeans organising. The Soviets came to the first conference in Paris, then walked out when the terms became clear, and then — the crucial point — made sure their satellites walked out too. Czechoslovakia, which had accepted the invitation, was summoned to Moscow and brutally un-accepted. Poland too. Europe was now visibly splitting in two, and the line of the split was Churchill's Iron Curtain, made flesh.

Marshall Aid would eventually pour thirteen billion dollars into Western Europe, and Britain would be the largest single recipient. It saved the Attlee government, arguably saved Western European democracy, and it marked the formal divorce of East and West. From 1948 on, there were two Europes — one being rebuilt with American money and British diplomacy, the other being bolted together by the Cominform, the new communist international, and by the Red Army that still sat, two million strong, in the middle of the continent.

And in the middle of that — a hundred and ten miles inside the Soviet zone, in a ruined city divided into four — sat Berlin.