The City on the Island
Berlin in 1948 was the most dangerous place on Earth, and the whole world knew it.
To understand why, you need the geography in your head. The Soviet occupation zone of Germany — the future East Germany — wrapped around the old capital like a sea around an island. The Western zones of Berlin, where two million Berliners lived under American, British, and French protection, were an island in that sea, connected to the West by negotiated road, rail, and air corridors. Every potato, every ton of coal, every cigarette that those two million people consumed had to come in along routes that ran through Soviet-held territory.
It was, in other words, a hostage city. Everyone understood this from the beginning. The only question was when the hostage-takers would move.
They moved because of money. In the spring of 1948, the three Western powers — pushed hard by Bevin, who had decided that a Western German state must be built from the three Western zones — agreed to fuse their zones economically and introduce a new currency, the Deutschmark, to replace the worthless Reichsmark that was strangling recovery. To Stalin, this was the red flag: a revived West Germany, tied to the West, sitting at the heart of Europe. On the twenty-fourth of June, 1948, the Soviets cut the land routes. Road: closed for "technical reasons." Rail: closed. Canal barge traffic on the Elbe and the Havel: stopped. Electricity to the Western sectors, supplied from the East: switched off.
Two million people, besieged, with food for about five weeks and coal for less.
In Washington, there was panic, and in some quarters talk of armed convoys — of sending tanks down the autobahn and seeing what happened. What would have happened, most likely, was the Third World War. The American military governor, General Lucius Clay, favoured the convoy. Ernest Bevin did not. And it was Bevin, in a Cabinet meeting in London on the twenty-fifth of June, who proposed the alternative, the one that sounds, the first time you hear it, like a joke: supply the city by air.
The arithmetic was monstrous. Two million people needed, at absolute minimum, four and a half thousand tons of food and coal a day — every day, indefinitely, through a German winter — flown in through three air corridors, each twenty miles wide, into battered airports in a ruined city, in all weathers. No one had ever attempted anything like it. The RAF's transport fleet was modest; the Americans doubted it could be done at all. Bevin's reply, in essence, was: we are doing it anyway. Britain, remember, was itself on rations. It committed its RAF anyway — Operation Plainfare, it was called — and then the Americans, shamed and inspired, piled in with Operation Vittles, and the Berlin Airlift was on.
For eleven months, the sky over Berlin never emptied. At the height of it, in what they called the Easter Parade of April 1949, a plane landed in Berlin every sixty-three seconds, around the clock — nearly thirteen thousand tons in a single day. The RAF flew Sunderland flying boats onto the Havel lake, their hulls salt-corrosion-proofed to carry sea salt — salt being one of the cargo items no one had thought of. Pilots flew through fog and ice and deliberate Soviet harassment — fighters buzzing the corridors, searchlights blinding pilots on approach, live-firing exercises in the flight paths. There were crashes. British, American, and German aircrew died — thirty-nine British personnel among them, a fact the commemorations sometimes forget. Berlin children gathered at the end of the Tempelhof runway, and an American pilot named Gail Halvorsen started dropping handkerchief parachutes of sweets — the "candy bomber" — and the RAF joined in, because this was a war of kindness, a siege broken not with shells but with flour and coal and chocolate.
And here is the thing about the Berlin Airlift that made it, perhaps, the single most effective act of Cold War strategy ever performed by the West: it reversed the moral poles of the conflict in the eyes of the world. Four years earlier, the Royal Air Force had burned German cities. Now British and American airmen were dying to feed Berliners, while the Red Army starved them. Germans watched it and drew their conclusions about which side of the Iron Curtain they wanted to live on. So did everyone else.
The blockade lasted three hundred and eighteen days. On the twelfth of May, 1949, Stalin lifted it — the first clear, undeniable defeat of Soviet policy in the Cold War, delivered not by force but by endurance. The Western zones of Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany that same month. The Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic in October. Germany was now two countries, and Berlin remained an island — an island that would keep trying to sink for another forty years.
But Bevin was not finished. The blockade had proved that Western Europe could not be held by improvisation. It needed a structure, a promise, a wall made of words strong enough to stop tanks.
The first brick was British. In March 1948, even before the blockade, Britain, France, and the three Benelux countries had signed the Treaty of Brussels — a fifty-year mutual defence pact, and, just as important in Bevin's mind, a demonstration to Washington that Europe was serious about standing up, so that America would commit to standing with it. Bevin had said the quiet part out loud to the Americans: Europe alone is not enough. You must join.
They did. On the fourth of April, 1949, in Washington, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Its heart was Article Five: an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all. For the first time in its history, the United States had bound itself by treaty to the defence of Europe in advance of any war. The Senate, which had refused to join the League of Nations after the first war, ratified it comfortably after the second.
NATO was, in the famous phrase attributed to its first Secretary General — a Briton, Lord Ismay, Churchill's old wartime chief of staff — designed "to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Every clause of that sentence was true, and every clause was, from London's point of view, a triumph of British policy. Ernest Bevin, the orphan from Somerset who had left school at eleven, had built the architecture that would hold Western Europe together for the rest of the century. When people list the great British achievements of the twentieth century, they list 1940, and the welfare state, and they are right. But NATO belongs on that list, and it is largely Bevin's.
There is a footnote to this chapter that matters more than most footnotes. In these same years, quietly, Britain and America were also building the other alliance — the secret one. In 1946, the two countries had formalised their wartime signals-intelligence marriage into what became known as the UKUSA Agreement: the interception and sharing of the world's communications between America's National Security Agency and Britain's Government Code and Cypher School, soon to be renamed GCHQ, in its new home at Cheltenham. It was the most secret treaty either country possessed — so secret that for decades its existence was officially deniable — and it made Britain irreplaceable to Washington in a way that had nothing to do with money. The "special relationship" the public saw was summits and speeches. The real special relationship was men and women in huts and listening stations reading the world's secrets and sharing them across the Atlantic every day. We will come back to those people. They run through this whole story like a watermark through a banknote.