The Grey Sea and the White Heat
Two great theatres of Britain's Cold War have been running beneath this story without a chapter of their own, and it is time to surface them. One is made of water. The other is made of equations.
The water first.
If the Cold War had ever gone hot in Europe, the decisive battle would not have been fought in the Fulda Gap. It would have been fought in the North Atlantic — the grey, cold, submarine-haunted ocean across which every American soldier, shell, and ration would have to come. The Soviet Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, was the largest submarine force in history; its mission, in war, would be to sever the Atlantic lifeline, exactly as the U-boats had twice tried to do. And the British contribution to NATO — the thing the alliance actually needed from Britain, more than its army, more than its diplomacy — was to make sure that never happened.
This was the Royal Navy's Cold War, and it was a war of listening. British frigates and submarines, patrolling the choke point where Soviet submarines had to pass — the gap between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, a phrase that lived in every naval officer's dreams. RAF Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, flying out of Kinloss in Scotland, quartering the ocean for hours on end, dropping sonobuoys, plotting contacts. The hydrophone arrays on the seabed. The quiet, endless, unglamorous work of knowing where the other side's submarines were. In a war, this would have been the Battle of the Atlantic, third time unlucky, fought with nuclear depth charges. In the peace, it was a permanent, invisible contest of hide and seek, played out week after week in the Norwegian Sea, in which British submariners became acknowledged masters of the most dangerous game in the world: trailing Soviet missile submarines, in silence, sometimes for days, close enough to photograph a propeller through the periscope. The crews could never talk about it. Some of the collisions that occasionally resulted — steel brushing steel in the dark, both boats limping home, neither government saying a word — are still officially secret on both sides.
The British Army's Cold War, meanwhile, lived in Germany. The British Army of the Rhine — the B A O R, a name that became a home address for hundreds of thousands of British servicemen and their families — held its sector of the North German plain for forty-five years: four divisions in the early years, still fifty thousand strong at the end, armour parked against the eastward roads, families in married quarters in Münster and Osnabrück and Herford, children who grew up more German than British. Whole generations of the British Army passed through the Rhine. It was the largest permanent overseas commitment in British history, and its purpose was never to fight and win — everyone knew what a Soviet offensive would do to the plain — but to be there, unmistakably, so that any Soviet move west was, from the first hour, a war with Britain and therefore with NATO and therefore with America. The tripwire. It was an expensive, grinding, essential way to spend half a century, and it is barely remembered now, except by the hundreds of thousands who did it.
And then there is the strangest naval episode of the whole era, because the opponent was an ally. The Cod Wars — three of them, between 1958 and 1976 — pitted the Royal Navy against the coastguard of Iceland over fishing limits. Frigates rammed, nets were cut, shots were fired across bows, and a British trawlerman was killed. On the face of it, a fisheries dispute. Underneath it, pure Cold War: Iceland held the keystone of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and hosted the American base at Keflavík, and every time the dispute escalated, Reykjavik threatened to leave NATO and expel the Americans — and Moscow smiled. Three times, the alliance held its breath while two of its members played chicken with frigates. Three times, Britain backed down, because the fish, in the end, mattered less than the gap. It was the Cold War in miniature: a conflict in which the real adversary was not even present, but won or lost every round.
Now the equations.
Britain entered the Cold War as, arguably, the most technologically sophisticated nation on Earth. It had invented radar, the jet engine, the programmable computer, the cavity magnetron; it had cracked the atomic problem first; it had built Colossus and broken Enigma. The white heat was real. The story of the next forty years is the story of how a country with that inheritance repeatedly produced world-beating machines — and repeatedly failed to turn them into power.
Some of the failures were famous. The TSR-2, cancelled in 1965 — a strike aircraft years ahead of anything flying, killed by cost and politics, its prototypes scrapped and its jigs destroyed with a thoroughness that looks, in retrospect, almost vindictive. Blue Streak, the missile that became a space rocket that became nothing — fired perfectly from Woomera in Australia, then abandoned; offered to Europe as the first stage of the Europa rocket, which failed; leaving Britain, in 1971, to launch its own satellite, Prospero, on its own rocket, Black Arrow — the only country ever to develop an independent satellite launch capability and then give it up. The programme was cancelled while the final rocket was already on the pad; they let it fly anyway, a farewell gesture, and it worked. Prospero is still up there. It will be for another half-century or so, a small, silent, slightly reproachful monument to the road not taken.
But against the catalogue of cancellation, set the quieter successes, because they were the ones the Cold War actually ran on. The Comet and the VC10; the Harrier jump jet, the only genuinely novel military aircraft concept of the post-war years, which the Americans eventually bought — to Britain's mingled pride and fury. Jodrell Bank, the great radio telescope in Cheshire, which in October 1957 was one of the few instruments on Earth able to track Sputnik's carrier rocket — and which spent the space age in the odd position of being trusted by both sides, Bernard Lovell's giant ear listening impartially to the beeping of the superpowers' ambitions. The signals intelligence machines, built with GCHQ's requirements in mind, that kept Britain at the leading edge of computing for classified purposes long after its commercial industry had faded. The world's first nuclear power station to feed a public grid, at Calder Hall in 1956 — opened by the Queen, powered by the same Windscale plutonium programme that would catch fire a year later, the sword and the ploughshare sharing a chimney.
The pattern, in the end, was the national pattern. Britain could produce genius; it could not produce scale. The Americans could do both. And so the white heat of technology, like the bomb and the empire and the sterling area, ended in the same place: partnership. British warheads on American missiles, British submariners on NATO's ocean, British codebreakers inside an American-built machine, British genius as a component in someone else's system. It was not the future anyone in 1945 had imagined. But it worked — and "it worked," after forty-five years on the edge of the abyss, is not a small thing to carve on the era's monument.