The Long Shadow
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Chapter 13

The Endgame

1985–1991  ·  approx. 12 min listen

The last six years of the Cold War moved at a speed that still takes the breath away. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the fourth leader in twenty-eight months — the Kremlin had begun to resemble a geriatric ward with missiles — and within six years, the Soviet Union itself would cease to exist. Nobody predicted it. Not the CIA, not MI6, not the Kremlin, not the dissidents, and not, though she would later permit the implication, Margaret Thatcher. The end of the Cold War was the most unpredicted great event of the twentieth century, and Britain's part in it was real, if not the part the national mythology prefers.

Gorbachev came intending to save Soviet communism, not to bury it. Glasnost — openness — and perestroika — restructuring — were meant to reform the system, to make it work. But openness, once granted to peoples who had been lied to for seventy years, proved uncontrollable: it let out Chernobyl, it let out the truth about Stalin, it let out nationalism, and it let out the question that could not be answered: if we are telling the truth now, why do we need the party that did the lying? Gorbachev never found an answer. By the time he understood the question, it was too late.

The superpower diplomacy of those years — Geneva 1985, Reykjavik 1986, Washington 1987, Moscow 1988 — was, for once, exactly what it appeared to be: two leaders, Reagan and Gorbachev, groping toward the end of the nuclear age. At Reykjavik, in October 1986, in a little white house by the sea, they came within an afternoon of agreeing to abolish all nuclear weapons — all of them — before the deal foundered on Reagan's refusal to abandon his Strategic Defense Initiative, the Star Wars missile shield. The world learned of it with a shudder and a thrill. Thatcher's reaction was pure Downing Street: she was horrified. The British nuclear deterrent, and NATO's whole strategy, rested on nuclear weapons; a president who would trade them away over a weekend needed a firm talking-to, and she flew to Washington and gave him one. It is one of the enduring paradoxes of her career: the Iron Lady, the great cold warrior, applying the brakes to the fastest disarmament proposal in history — and, on the logic of deterrence as she understood it, right to do so. Reykjavik failed, but it changed the weather. A year later, in December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the I N F Treaty, abolishing an entire class of nuclear weapons — the intermediate-range missiles. The SS-20s would be scrapped. The Pershings would be scrapped. And the cruise missiles at Greenham Common, the cause of a decade of protest, would be scrapped too.

The women of Greenham, it must be recorded, did not claim the victory — the treaty was signed over their heads, by men, for reasons of superpower arithmetic — but they were entitled to. The missiles came because of politics; they went because of politics; and the women on the fence were part of the politics. In 1991 the last cruise missile left Greenham. The camp stayed. The fence was eventually taken down, and the common was given back to the people of Berkshire, which is where it had started.

Thatcher's role in the endgame deserves a cool look, because it has been both exaggerated and underrated. The exaggeration is the claim that she and Reagan won the Cold War by strength alone — that the arms build-up of the early eighties broke the Soviet economy and forced surrender. There is something in it: the Soviet system really was rotting, really could not match Western technology, and Reagan's spending, and Star Wars in particular, genuinely alarmed the Soviet leadership. But the central decision — to let go, to not send the tanks in 1989 as they had been sent in 1953 and 1956 and 1968 — was Gorbachev's, and it was a moral choice, not an economic necessity. Other men, offered the same ledger, would have chosen the tanks. The underrating is the converse: the notion that Britain was a mere spectator of the endgame. It was not. Thatcher's early embrace of Gorbachev — informed by Gordievsky's intelligence, remember — gave him Western credibility when he desperately needed it. She carried messages between Washington and Moscow. And when the end came, Britain was at the table for the great settlement, as we will see.

There was also, in November 1988, a moment that deserves its place in the annals of pure British Cold War oddity. Thatcher, the tribune of the free market, had spent the decade fighting the Soviet system; yet when she visited Moscow and walked in Red Square with Gorbachev, the crowds surged toward her, and the Soviet press covered her like a tsarina. The Iron Lady was, in the strange final years, almost popular in Russia — precisely because she was what she was: definite, unsubtle, strong. The Russian word for it is a compliment. History is not without a sense of humour.

Then came 1989. The year of miracles.

It is worth saying plainly what 1989 felt like from Britain, because feeling is the part the timelines leave out. All through that year, the television showed the impossible becoming routine. In June, Solidarity — the Polish trade union that had been banned, its leaders jailed, its chaplain murdered by the secret police — won the first free elections in the Eastern bloc in forty years, every contested seat, a landslide. In the summer, Hungary cut the barbed wire on the Austrian border, and East Germans began driving their Trabants west through the gap, abandoning them in fields like shed skins. In October, the protests in Leipzig grew from hundreds to hundreds of thousands, and the order to shoot was never given — because Moscow had said, in advance, that there would be no tanks. The Sinatra doctrine, Gorbachev's spokesman joked: the satellites could do it their way. After forty years of Ulbricht and Brezhnev doctrines, the punchline was liberation.

And on the ninth of November, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell.

By mistake, essentially — a flustered East German official, Günter Schabowski, told a press conference that new travel rules applied "immediately," when the plan had been a managed process; the television carried it; the crowds gathered at the checkpoints; and the guards, facing thousands of their own people and no orders, opened the gates. Berliners danced on the Wall with champagne and hammers. The city that had been the hostage of the Cold War — the divided island this book began in, the city Bevin fed by air, the city where the tunnels were dug and the spies were swapped on the Glienicke Bridge — became, in one night, the symbol of its end. Britain watched it like everyone else: in wonder, and in the peculiar English mode of joy laced with worry.

The worry had a name: Germany.

Because if the Wall was down, then German reunification was coming, and reunification meant a single German state of eighty million people, the largest economy in Europe, at the centre of the continent — the question that two world wars had been fought over. And here, in the last act of the Cold War, Britain's role curdled. Thatcher opposed reunification — privately, vehemently, and for longer than was diplomatically defensible. She raised it with Gorbachev; she raised it with Mitterrand; her ministers and advisers muttered about the German character in terms that, when the record emerged, caused a diplomatic incident. She was, in a narrow sense, not wrong to worry about what a reunified Germany would do to the European balance — the anxieties of 1990 echo faintly in Europe's arguments even now. But she was wrong in the larger sense: reunification was coming regardless, the only question was whether it would come inside the Western structures or outside them, and the task of statecraft was to bind it in — in NATO, in Europe — not to stand on the shore ordering back the tide. It was the Americans, above all President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker, who managed the great negotiation — the "Two Plus Four" talks, the two Germanies plus the four wartime occupying powers, including Britain — that brought a united Germany into NATO in October 1990, with Soviet agreement, in exchange for promises and money. Britain signed the treaty, as an occupying power must. But its voice in the settlement was a minor key, and the Prime Minister's private resistance had been noted everywhere. The country that had done so much to build the post-war order was oddly graceless at the moment of its vindication.

Thatcher herself did not see the end. In November 1990, her own party removed her — over Europe, over the poll tax, over eleven years of accumulated enmities — and the Iron Lady left Downing Street in tears. The Cold War she had fought all her adult life outlasted her premiership by barely a year.

The final act was Russian. In August 1991, the old guard struck back: a coup of Communist hardliners seized Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha and declared a state of emergency, and tanks — for the last time — rolled into Moscow. It collapsed in three days, defeated by Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank outside the Russian parliament, by a hundred thousand Muscovites in the streets, by soldiers who would not shoot, and by the simple fact that the coup's leaders were drunk, divided, and decades too late. Britain's small part in those days was characteristic: GCHQ and the BBC. The BBC Russian Service, at the moment of maximum danger, was one of the main channels by which Russians themselves learned what was happening in their own capital — the voice behind the curtain, one last time, telling the truth when the official voices lied. On Christmas Day, 1991, Gorbachev resigned, and the red flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time. The Soviet Union — the adversary of half a century, the empire that had cost the West a trillion dollars and the East immeasurably more — was gone, without the war that everyone for forty-five years had believed would be its ending.

That is the thing to hold onto. The Cold War ended, and nobody fired the missiles. Given the alternative histories available, it counts among the best things that ever happened.