The Long Shadow
← All chapters
Chapter 03

Reds, Atoms, and a War in the Far East

1949–1953  ·  approx. 9 min listen

Nineteen-forty-nine was the year the Cold War became global and became nuclear — both at once.

In August, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, years earlier than Western intelligence had predicted. The shock in Washington was seismic; the American nuclear monopoly, on which so much Western confidence rested, had lasted four years. In October, after a civil war of twenty years, Mao Zedong stood over the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking and proclaimed the People's Republic of China. A fifth of humanity had gone communist in an afternoon. In the chancelleries of the West, it was suddenly possible to believe that history itself had a direction, and the direction was not theirs.

Britain's response to the China earthquake was characteristically pragmatic — and characteristically different from America's. In January 1950, Britain recognised the People's Republic. It did so for unglamorous reasons: trade, and Hong Kong. British commercial interests in China were old and large, and Hong Kong, the crown colony, sat on China's doorstep like a china egg on a doorstep, indefensible if Peking ever truly wanted it. Washington, where "Who lost China?" had become a political witch-hunt, was furious. It was an early demonstration of a pattern that runs through this whole book: Britain and America were allies, often intimate allies, but they were not the same country, and their Cold Wars were not identical. Britain's Cold War was always also about an empire, a currency, and a small island's trade. Keep that in mind, because it explains decisions that otherwise look eccentric — and none more so than the one we come to now.

At dawn on the twenty-fifth of June, 1950, the army of communist North Korea poured across the thirty-eighth parallel into the South.

Korea was a country most Britons could not have found on a map — "a small peninsula," as one weary Foreign Office man put it, "hanging out of Asia's backside." It had been divided, almost as an afterthought, at the end of the Pacific war: Soviets taking the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel, Americans south of it. Two client states had grown up on either side, each claiming the whole. Now the North, with Stalin's blessing and Chinese sympathy, was trying to reunify the country by force, and the South was collapsing in front of it.

The response was astonishingly fast. The United Nations Security Council — the Soviet delegate was boycotting it that month over China's seat, one of the great own-goals of diplomatic history — condemned the invasion and called on member states to resist it. Truman committed American forces within days. And Attlee's government committed Britain.

It is worth stopping on this decision, because it was not easy, and it was not cheap. Britain in 1950 was broke, exhausted, five years out of a world war, and engaged already in a shooting war against communist guerrillas in Malaya. Its army was stretched from the Rhine to Hong Kong. The Cabinet knew that joining the Americans in Korea would mean rearmament, and rearmament would mean cuts to the new Jerusalem — to the housing programme, to the health service, to everything the government had been elected to build. They did it anyway. Bevin was by now a dying man — his heart was failing; he would be dead within the year, in April 1951 — but his conviction held the Cabinet: the defence of Europe depended on the credibility of America, and the credibility of America was now being tested in Asia. If Britain wanted the Americans to stand on the Elbe, Britain had to stand on the Imjin.

So Britain went to war again. National service — conscription, unprecedented in peacetime — was extended from eighteen months to two years. A rearmament programme of four point seven billion pounds was announced, the biggest in British peacetime history. And British soldiers — conscripts mostly, nineteen-year-olds from Glasgow and Liverpool and Cardiff who had expected to paint barracks in Germany — found themselves in the mountains of Korea.

The war seesawed. The UN forces, under General Douglas MacArthur, were nearly pushed into the sea, then broke out with the Inchon landings and drove the North Koreans back almost to the Chinese border — and then, in November 1950, China entered the war. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese "volunteers" came across the Yalu River in the frozen dark, and the UN armies reeled back down the peninsula in the worst defeat of American arms in modern memory. In Washington, Truman's administration contemplated the unthinkable; MacArthur spoke openly of atomic bombs on Chinese bases. And here, Britain played the role it would play again and again across the next forty years: the ally whose job was to put a hand on the American shoulder and say, gently, no.

Attlee flew to Washington in December 1950 — a hurried, anxious visit — to argue against escalation and against the bomb. The Americans, who were not actually about to use it, gave him reassurances he mostly already had, and the press on both sides exaggerated both the crisis and the visit's effect. But the pattern was set: London as the junior partner who earns his place in the room precisely so that, at the moment of maximum danger, there is someone in the room.

The British soldier's Korea is a story in itself, and the heart of it is a stand made in April 1951 by the Gloucestershire Regiment — the Glosters — on the Imjin River. Holding a hill line against a Chinese army, surrounded, shelled, fought out, they held for three days while the offensive broke against them. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel James Carne, was captured; their last stand passed into legend. The famous exchange came from the battle: a British brigadier, asked by an American general how things stood, replied with majestic understatement that things were "a bit sticky" — which the American took to mean fine. They were not fine. Of the Glosters, barely a fifth made it out; the rest were killed or marched off to prison camps on the Yalu. Britain lost over a thousand dead in Korea all told. The war settled into a meat-grinder along roughly the old border and ended, in July 1953, in an armistice that is technically still in force — the peninsula is still at war, frozen at the thirty-eighth parallel, the first of the Cold War's great unfinished business.

And the cost at home came due. Rearmament broke the Labour government. The health charges imposed to pay for it split the party — Aneurin Bevan resigned in fury, beginning a civil war inside Labour that would last a decade. In October 1951, exhausted, divided, and out of ideas after six years of rationing and austerity, Labour lost the general election. Winston Churchill returned to Downing Street at the age of seventy-six.

The Attlee government's Cold War record is, on any fair reading, immense. It had built NATO, broken the Berlin blockade, taken Marshall Aid and made it work, stood in Korea, recognised the limits of power in Greece and Hong Kong, and — in the deepest secrecy, as we are about to see — decided that Britain would be an atomic power. It did all this while founding the National Health Service and building a welfare state, on an overdraft, in a country where bread was rationed. Historians argue about everything else; about this, there is not much argument. The foundations of the Western position in the Cold War were poured, in large part, in London, between 1945 and 1951.

But beneath those foundations, termites were at work. Because while Bevin was building alliances in the open, other Britons — highly placed, trusted, decorated Britons — were working for the other side. And one of them had been inside the atomic programme from the very beginning.

Which brings us to the secrets. All the secrets.