The Independent Deterrent
In January 1947, in the deepest secrecy, a small committee of the Attlee Cabinet met in Downing Street and decided to build the atomic bomb.
No Parliament was told. No budget line appeared in any published accounts. The decision — the single most expensive and consequential weapons decision in British history — was taken by six ministers in a subcommittee with the bland name of G E N one sixty-three, and concealed from the House of Commons for years. When money was needed, it was quietly buried in the accounts of other departments. The whole thing cost, in the end, the equivalent of billions, and for the first two years, as far as Parliament and the public knew, it did not exist.
This tells you something essential about the British state in the Cold War. Beneath the noisy democracy — the elections, the party conferences, the questions in the House — there ran a second, silent state: committees with codenames, budgets without labels, decisions taken by a dozen men in a room and locked in safes. The bomb was born in that silent state. So was much else in this book.
Why did Britain want the bomb? The official reasons came later. The real reasons were a tangle of fear, pride, and strategy, and they are worth untangling.
The fear was real and specific. Britain had invented, in large part, the science that made the bomb possible. It was a British-based physicist, Rudolf Peierls, and an Austrian refugee, Otto Frisch, working in Birmingham in 1940, who had first calculated that a bomb of usable size was actually feasible — the Frisch-Peierls memorandum, the true founding document of the atomic age. Britain's wartime programme, codenamed Tube Alloys, had been ahead of America's until the sheer industrial cost forced the two to merge. British scientists had gone to Los Alamos and worked at the heart of the Manhattan Project. And then, in 1946, the American Congress — in an act of breathtaking ingratitude, as London saw it — passed the McMahon Act, forbidding the sharing of atomic information with anyone. Including Britain. Including the partner that had started it all. Attlee's government read the McMahon Act as a message: in the atomic age, you are either inside the club on your own terms, or you are a client.
And then there was the strategy, which was really about the Americans. Listen to the two most quoted sentences of the whole affair. The first is the Foreign Office official Sir Alexander Cadogan, distilling the problem to its essence: Britain needed the bomb because otherwise it would be "entirely in the hands of the Americans." The second is Ernest Bevin himself, at the decisive meeting, in October 1946, brushing aside the Chancellor's complaints about cost: "We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs. We've got to have the bloody Union Jack flying on top of it."
The bloody Union Jack on top of it. There it is, in one sentence — the whole psychology of post-war Britain. Not megalomania; something more poignant. A determination that whatever Britain became, it would not become a dependency. The bomb was a seat at the table, a claim to remain a great power, an insurance policy against the day the Americans might hesitate. Because everyone in that room had done the same terrible arithmetic: Britain could not defend itself against the Red Army conventionally. Two million Soviet soldiers stood in the middle of Europe. If the Americans ever wavered — and remember, this was a country that had abandoned its allies twice in living memory, in 1920 and, in London's fear, perhaps again — then Britain would stand alone again, as in 1940, except this time against an enemy with the bomb.
So Britain built it. The project was directed by Lord Portal, the wartime chief of the air staff; the scientific chief was William Penney, a quiet, brilliant mathematician who had been at Los Alamos and had measured the ruins of Nagasaki. The reactors went up at Windscale in Cumbria, on a stretch of rainy coastline that would later be renamed Sellafield after the events we will come to. The plutonium was bred there; the weapon was designed at a former RAF airfield called Aldermaston in Berkshire, which would become, as the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, one of the most secret places in the country — and, in time, one of the most protested.
And on the third of October, 1952, in the Monte Bello Islands off the northwest coast of Australia, Britain's bomb went off. The device had been placed in the hold of a frigate, HMS Plym, anchored in the lagoon — partly to study what a nuclear weapon smuggled into a port would do to a port, a thought that was already haunting planners. The yield was twenty-five kilotons, bigger than Nagasaki. Plym simply vanished; nothing was left of her but a few fragments on the seabed and a stain of radioactivity on the water. Britain was the world's third nuclear power.
The telegram sent back to London contained a single codeword. In Downing Street, Winston Churchill — prime minister again by now — received the news with satisfaction. He had inherited the project from Attlee and embraced it completely; on this, as on so much of the Cold War, the two parties were in deeper agreement than they ever admitted in public.
There are two postscripts to this story, one terrible and one triumphant, and both belong here.
The terrible one is Windscale. In October 1957, one of the Windscale plutonium reactors caught fire. It burned for three days while workers — some of them heroes whose names deserve remembering — poured water and CO2 into a burning radioactive core, not knowing whether they were preventing a catastrophe or building a bomb. The fire released radioactive iodine across Cumbria and beyond; milk from hundreds of square miles of dairy farms was poured into the Irish Sea. The official inquiry was suppressed and its findings watered down, because the government's overriding fear was that the truth would poison the nuclear relationship with America just as it was finally being repaired. Windscale was the worst nuclear accident in British history and, for twenty years, the worst in the world. The files stayed closed for thirty years. The reactors' chimneys still stand, being dismantled even now, a job that will take decades more. The Cold War had a domestic fallout, literally, and Cumbria got it.
The triumphant postscript came the following year, 1958, and it vindicated everything Attlee's committee had gambled on. The McMahon Act — the law that had shut Britain out — was amended. Full nuclear cooperation between Britain and America resumed: warhead designs, materials, submarine technology, everything. And why? Partly Suez, partly Sputnik, partly the sheer diplomatic repair work of Harold Macmillan — but mostly this: Britain had built its own bomb, and its own hydrogen bomb was about to follow, tested over Christmas Island in the Pacific in 1957 and 1958, megaton flashes over empty ocean. The Americans had discovered, as the British always intended they should, that it was better to have the junior partner inside the tent. From 1958 until today, the nuclear special relationship — warheads, submarines, intelligence — has been the deepest, most continuous thread of the whole alliance. Britain bought its way into that room with the Monte Bello shot. Whatever one thinks of nuclear weapons, as an act of statecraft it was one of the most successful investments in British history.
And it nearly didn't work — because of a spy. Which brings us to the river beneath the story.