The Wilderness of Mirrors
There is a version of the Cold War that is fought with armies and budgets and speeches, and then there is the real one — or so the spies would tell you — fought in safe houses and dead-letter drops, with microfilm and betrayal. Britain, for complicated historical reasons, was the great battlefield of that second war. And in the 1950s, it became painfully clear that Britain had been losing it for twenty years.
Start with Klaus Fuchs, because he is where the two stories — the bomb and the spies — collide.
Fuchs was a German communist, a refugee from Hitler, a physicist of the first rank. Britain took him in, employed him on Tube Alloys, naturalised him, and sent him to Los Alamos, where he worked at the very core of the plutonium bomb design. He was, by all accounts, a mild, quiet, courteous man. He was also, from 1941 onwards, a Soviet agent of priceless value. He gave Moscow the design of the plutonium bomb — essentially the blueprint of the Nagasaki weapon — and later, back in England at Harwell, details of the early hydrogen bomb work. The speed of the Soviet atomic test in 1949 owed much to Klaus Fuchs.
What finally caught him was not detective work in the ordinary sense. It was Venona — the ultra-secret Anglo-American project, run from Arlington Hall and shared with GCHQ, that had spent years patiently decrypting wartime Soviet intelligence traffic, message by message, codeword by codeword. Venona is one of the great untold triumphs of Western intelligence: a window, cracked open just slightly, into the KGB's wartime cables. It could never be revealed in court — the source was too precious — so Fuchs had to be made to confess by other means. In January 1950, after weeks of gentle pressure from an MI5 officer named William Skardon, Fuchs confessed. He was tried at the Old Bailey, the proceedings astonishingly swift, and sentenced to fourteen years — the maximum for espionage on behalf of a country not then, technically, an enemy. He served nine, was released, and went to East Germany, where he became head of the physics institute and died, unrepentant, in 1988.
The Fuchs case detonated in Washington like, well, a bomb. A British-employed, British-naturalised scientist had handed Stalin the atomic secret. Combined with the McMahon Act already in force, it confirmed every American suspicion about British security — suspicions that cost Britain years of nuclear cooperation. And Fuchs was only the beginning.
On the night of the twenty-fifth of May, 1951, two British diplomats walked out of their lives and vanished.
Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean were officers of the Foreign Office. Burgess was a brilliant, drunken, scandalous, charming wreck of a man, a Cambridge intellectual who had somehow survived years in the heart of the establishment despite doing everything — drinking, indiscretion, open contempt — that should have ended his career. Maclean was his opposite: tall, correct, a former head of the American department, a man so respectable he seemed upholstered. He had also, for years, been one of the KGB's most valuable agents in the world. From the British Embassy in Washington in the late forties, Maclean had told Moscow the innermost secrets of Western atomic and diplomatic policy. Venona had been closing in on him for months — he was codenamed Homer in the Soviet cables — and MI5 was weeks, perhaps days, from arresting him.
Someone warned him. Both men drove to Southampton, boarded a cross-channel ferry, and disappeared. They surfaced five years later at a press conference in Moscow, defiant and faintly ridiculous, declaring their faith in communism to a room of astonished journalists.
The disappearance of Burgess and Maclean was a national trauma of a peculiarly British kind. This was not like Fuchs, a foreigner who had betrayed an adopted country. These were the country's own: public school, Cambridge, the Foreign Office, the club, the accent. The question everyone asked was not only how they had done it, but how they had been allowed to — how two such men had been promoted, protected, and waved through every door by an establishment that vetted by dinner party. The answer was uncomfortable, and it was the real lesson of the affair: the British ruling class trusted itself absolutely, and the KGB had understood this long before MI5 did. Kim Philby — we will get to him — used to say that he was protected by "the genuine conspiracy of the English gentleman": the refusal to believe that one of us could be one of them.
And the rot went deeper still. Because the man who had almost certainly tipped off Maclean was the Third Man.
Harold Adrian Russell Philby — Kim, after Kipling's boy spy — was the most successful Soviet agent of the twentieth century, and one of the most destructive human beings ever to wear a British passport. Recruited by the NKVD in the 1930s, along with Burgess and Maclean and the art historian Anthony Blunt and the diplomat John Cairncross — the Cambridge Five, as they became known — Philby had joined the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, during the war and risen like a rocket. By 1949 he was MI6's liaison in Washington, one of the most sensitive posts in Western intelligence, privy to CIA operations, Venona decryptions, joint plans. Everything he saw went to Moscow.
The wreckage is hard to overstate. Philby betrayed operations wholesale. Anti-communist émigré networks, parachuted into Albania and the Baltic states and Ukraine in the late forties and early fifties in brave, doomed attempts to roll back the Iron Curtain, were rolled up and shot — hundreds of men sent to their deaths, some of them on operations Philby had personally helped design. He later wrote about it with glacial calm. When Burgess and Maclean fled, suspicion fell on Philby — he had, insanely, been Burgess's landlord in Washington — and he was forced out of MI6. But here is where the English gentleman's conspiracy reasserted itself: no proof, no Venona in court, and so no prosecution. In 1955, the Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan — remember that name; this story will catch up with him — stood up in the House of Commons and publicly cleared Philby's name. Philby held a triumphant press conference in his mother's flat and denied everything, with total, contemptuous conviction. It was one of the great bluffs of the century.
It lasted eight more years. In January 1963, tipped off — by whom is still argued over; the file, even now, keeps its secrets — Philby slipped away from Beirut aboard a Soviet freighter and surfaced in Moscow. The Third Man had gone home.
The Philby affair poisoned the Anglo-American intelligence relationship for a generation, and it poisoned something inside Britain too. If Philby could be a traitor, who couldn't? MI6 spent the sixties tearing itself apart hunting for the Fourth Man, the Fifth Man, the mole at the top — a hunt that consumed careers and destroyed judgement. The head of MI5, Peter Wright, became convinced that his own Director General, Sir Roger Hollis, was a Soviet agent, and ran a secret investigation inside the service against its own chief. Nothing was ever proved; most historians now believe Hollis was innocent. But the fact that the suspicion could live for years at the very top of the security service tells you what Philby had done. He had planted a bomb in the British establishment's sense of itself, and it kept exploding for thirty years — in books, in accusations, in the obsessive, brilliant fiction of John le Carré, whose mole-hunting novel Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy is, at heart, a national psychoanalysis.
And yet — and this is the part the spy scandals obscure — the British secret war was not all defeat. Far from it.
Consider GCHQ. While the human spies were being unmasked, the listeners of Cheltenham were building, with their American partners, the largest intelligence machine in the free world. British listening posts — in Cyprus, in Hong Kong, in Germany hard against the border, at sea — vacuumed up the communications of the Warsaw Pact. The UKUSA arrangement meant that Washington's global take was London's take too: a small country plugged into a giant's nervous system. When the House of Commons debated defence, ministers spoke of "sources" and looked wise. The sources were often girls and boys with headphones in Portishead and Scarborough and Little Sai Wan.
Consider, too, the double-cross inheritance. In the Second World War, Britain had run the most successful deception apparatus in history — the Double Cross System, which turned every German agent in Britain and used them to lie to Berlin, culminating in the great D-Day deceptions. The people who built that machine — and its successor traditions in MI5 and MI6 — brought into the Cold War a culture of patient, devious, painstaking counter-intelligence that would eventually produce real victories. The recruitment of Oleg Penkovsky, the GRU colonel whose information in 1961 and 1962 told the West what Soviet missiles could and could not do — run jointly by MI6 and the CIA, serviced by a British businessman named Greville Wynne — may have been the single most valuable human intelligence operation of the Cold War. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, Penkovsky's reporting let Kennedy know the true state of Soviet nuclear strength: bluff and weakness, not superiority. Both Penkovsky and Wynne were arrested; Penkovsky was executed, Wynne exchanged. We will meet the British end of that story again.
And consider Berlin — the city that kept trying to sink. In 1954 and 1955, British and American intelligence dug a tunnel a third of a mile long, from the American sector into the East, and tapped the main Soviet military communications cables. The Berlin Tunnel fed the West a river of high-grade intelligence for eleven months. The catch, discovered decades later: the KGB knew about it from the start, because George Blake — the MI6 officer and Soviet agent we will meet shortly — had told them. They let it run anyway, rather than expose their source, feeding it a diet of genuine but non-critical traffic. Even the West's greatest triumphs had a Russian watermark. That was the Cold War intelligence game in a nutshell: a wilderness of mirrors, in le Carré's phrase, in which nothing, not even victory, was ever quite what it seemed.
The mirror war had its poets, and this matters more than it might seem. The Cold War was the first ideological conflict to be fought substantially in culture — in novels, films, radio broadcasts. And Britain punched enormously above its weight. The BBC's language services, and later the World Service, were among the most trusted voices behind the Iron Curtain; people in Prague and Warsaw and Moscow listened in secret, on crackly shortwave, at real personal risk. George Orwell, dying of tuberculosis on a Scottish island in 1948, wrote Nineteen Eighty-Four and gave the whole world the vocabulary of totalitarianism — Big Brother, doublethink, the memory hole. It was smuggled east and read there as documentary. And there was the Information Research Department — the IRD — a secret Foreign Office unit founded in 1948 to fight communist propaganda with anti-communist propaganda: feeding material to journalists, publishing books, subsidising magazines, fighting the battle of ideas by covert means. It was, depending on your view, either a necessary weapon in a war the other side was already fighting without scruple, or a democratic state secretly manipulating its own public. It was probably both. It lasted until 1977, when David Owen shut it down.