The Old Man and the Bomb
Winston Churchill returned to power in October 1951, aged seventy-six, half-deaf, having suffered at least one serious stroke, and convinced of two things: that the hydrogen bomb had made the Cold War infinitely more dangerous, and that he personally was the man to end it.
The second conviction produced one of the strangest episodes of his long career. Churchill — the man of Fulton, the iron-curtain prophet — spent his last premiership pursuing a summit: a meeting with the Soviet leadership to talk the world back from the edge. He called it "a parley at the summit" — the word summit, meaning a meeting of superpower leaders, enters the language from Churchill in these years. He believed, with some justice, that he alone had the standing to do it; he had dealt with Stalin as an equal, and he understood, as he told his doctor, that with thermonuclear weapons the whole game had changed — the difference between the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, he said, was the difference between a war and the end of history.
The Americans wanted none of it. Truman's administration, and then Eisenhower's after January 1953, thought a summit premature at best and appeasement at worst — and suspected, privately, that the old man was past it and chasing a Nobel Peace Prize. And then, on the fifth of March, 1953, Stalin died.
For a moment, everything was in flux. In Moscow, the succession struggle — Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev circling one another — produced strange new sounds: talk of "peaceful coexistence," small gestures, an armistice in Korea that July. Churchill saw his moment and pressed for a four-power meeting. Eisenhower stalled. And in June 1953, Churchill suffered a massive stroke, concealed from the public with an efficiency that seems astonishing even by the standards of the time — the press was told the Prime Minister was "tired" — and the moment passed. Beria was arrested and shot. The East German workers rose in revolt that same June and were crushed by Soviet tanks while the West watched and did nothing — a lesson, learned in blood, about the limits of Western support for liberation behind the curtain, a lesson Budapest would learn again in 1956.
Churchill recovered, astonishingly, and governed for two more years. But the summit never happened. In April 1955 he resigned, and went to the House of Commons one last time as Prime Minister having failed at the thing he most wanted. History's verdict on the summit chase is mixed. But give the old man this: he had grasped, earlier than almost anyone in office on either side, that thermonuclear weapons had made the Cold War unwinnable in any traditional sense, and that the only way out was through negotiation from strength. Forty years later, that is exactly how it ended.
His legacy at home was the hydrogen bomb. Churchill's Cabinet took the decision in 1954 to build a British thermonuclear weapon, and the tests — Operation Grapple, over Christmas Island in the Pacific, beginning in May 1957 — made Britain the third thermonuclear power. The young servicemen who watched those tests from the decks of ships, in sunglasses, hands over eyes, seeing the bones of their own hands through the flash, are still with us; some of them spent the rest of their lives fighting the Ministry of Defence over the cancers and illnesses they believed followed. Their story is a quiet, unresolved footnote of the British thermonuclear age, and it deserves to be said aloud, which is why it is in this book.
Churchill's successor was the man who had waited longest for the job in modern history: Anthony Eden — handsome, brilliant, fragile, the great foreign-policy expert of his generation, Foreign Secretary three times over, the heir apparent for fifteen years. He finally got the crown in April 1955. Within twenty months it had destroyed him, and Britain's pretensions to independent world power had been destroyed with it.
The place where it happened was Egypt. The name of the catastrophe was Suez.