The Year the World Stood Still
Nineteen fifty-six is the hinge year of this book. Everything before it leads up; everything after it leads down. In the space of eight autumn weeks, the world watched two crises at once — one in the deserts of Egypt, one in the streets of Budapest — and both of them, in their different ways, told the truth about where power really lay.
The story begins with a ditch.
The Suez Canal was not just a waterway. It was the jugular of the British world-system: the route to India and the Gulf and the Far East, two-thirds of Europe's oil flowing through it, built with French money and Egyptian lives, owned by a company whose biggest shareholder was the British government, and guarded — until the British finally agreed to withdraw, in June 1956, under an agreement Eden himself had negotiated two years earlier — by eighty thousand British troops. It was, in the British imagination, less a canal than a birthright.
And in July 1956, the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalised it.
Nasser was the new kind of Cold War leader, and the West never quite learned how to read him. He was an Egyptian nationalist — the first native Egyptian to rule Egypt in two and a half thousand years, as he liked to say — and his quarrel was with empire, not with capitalism. He wanted the Americans' money for his great project, the Aswan High Dam; when Washington, irritated by his arms deal with Czechoslovakia and his recognition of Communist China, abruptly withdrew the dam offer in July, Nasser struck back. In a speech in Alexandria, before a delirious crowd, he pronounced the codeword — the name of the canal's builder, de Lesseps — that sent his men into the canal company offices. The canal was Egypt's. The tolls would build the dam.
In London, Anthony Eden snapped. Here we must be fair to the man before we bury him. Eden's reading of Nasser was the reading of a generation: he had spent the 1930s watching democracies feed dictators one concession at a time, and he had resigned over it in 1938. Nasser, to him, was Mussolini on the Nile; the canal, another Rhineland. "We all know this is how fascist governments behave," he told his ministers, "and we all remember, only too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism." The memory of Munich — the supreme cautionary tale of his generation — was not analysis. It was reflex. And the reflex was shared, initially, by much of the country and most of the press.
What followed was a conspiracy, and it remains, seventy years on, faintly incredible. Britain and France could not simply invade Egypt — the United States, in an election year, under President Eisenhower, had forbidden it. So they conspired with Israel. The three parties met in secret at Sèvres, outside Paris, and agreed a script so cynical that the British government spent years denying the written protocol existed. Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then "intervene" — posing as peacemakers — issuing an ultimatum to both sides to withdraw from the canal zone, knowing Egypt would refuse, whereupon Anglo-French forces would seize the canal to "protect" it. Collusion, it was called. It was a lie told to Parliament, to the United Nations, to the American ally, and to the British people.
On the twenty-ninth of October, Israel invaded. On the thirty-first, British and French bombers began striking Egypt — the RAF flying from Cyprus. And on the fifth of November, in one of the strangest conjunctions in modern history, two armies moved at once: British paratroopers dropped onto Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal — and Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest.
Budapest needs a paragraph of its own, because it was the other half of the lesson.
Hungary had risen. In late October 1956, inspired by the thaw in Poland, students and workers had poured into the streets demanding the end of the one-party state. The statue of Stalin in the centre of Budapest was pulled down and dragged through the streets by its boots. Imre Nagy, a reform communist, became prime minister and, as the revolution swelled, announced free elections and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. For eleven days, Hungary was free. And then, in the small hours of the fourth of November, the Red Army came back. Two hundred thousand men, six thousand tanks. The Hungarian army and the workers of Budapest fought them with rifles and petrol bombs. Somewhere between two and three thousand Hungarians died. Nagy was tricked out of asylum, and later hanged.
And the West — Radio Free Europe had spent years encouraging the captive peoples to rise — watched, and did nothing. There was never any real question of doing anything: Hungary was inside the Soviet sphere, and everyone, including every Hungarian with a map, knew what war over Budapest would mean. But the timing made it worse. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt gave Moscow a gift: it split the West at the precise moment of maximum Soviet shame, and it handed Soviet propaganda a moral equivalence to work with — you invade Egypt, we crush Hungary, who are you to preach? The two crises neutralised each other. It was one of the greatest own-goals in the history of Western policy, and it was scored by London and Paris.
Meanwhile, at Suez, the military operation was succeeding and everything else was collapsing.
The Americans — who had not been consulted and had been actively deceived — were enraged. Eisenhower, facing re-election in forty-eight hours, felt personally betrayed by Eden, a man he had known since the war. And Washington's weapon was not diplomatic. It was financial.
Remember the mortgage. Britain's reserves were draining as holders of sterling, reading the news, sold the pound. Britain needed support from the International Monetary Fund to defend the currency — and the IMF was, in effect, an American instrument. The word came out of Washington with brutal clarity: no ceasefire, no money. No withdrawal from Egypt, no oil, no credit, no rescue. Britain, the nation that had faced down Hitler alone, was brought to its knees in six days not by the Red Army but by a run on the pound and a phone call from its best friend.
On the sixth of November, Eden announced a ceasefire. The British and French withdrew; United Nations troops replaced them — the UN's first real peacekeeping force, an idea pushed hard by Canada's Lester Pearson. Nasser kept the canal. The blocking ships the Egyptians had sunk in it kept it closed for months anyway. Britain had gained nothing and lost almost everything: its prestige, its credit, its cover story, and its illusions.
Eden, his health broken — he had been ill for years, running on amphetamines and fevers — resigned in January 1957. He went to the Caribbean to recover and lived for twenty more years, insisting to the end that he had been right about Nasser and wronged by Washington. On the second point, at least, he was not entirely wrong. But the verdict of history landed on the first point: the analogy was false. Nasser was not Hitler. Egypt was not Germany. And Britain, whatever its past, was no longer a power that could act against the declared will of the United States. That was the real lesson of Suez, and every British government since has organised its foreign policy around it. The Suez crisis did not create Britain's dependence on America; it revealed it, to the British themselves, in a single unbearable fortnight.
And notice what the Soviets took away from the same fortnight. They had crushed Hungary at zero cost. The West had done nothing, and the West had been busy eating one of its own. The Iron Curtain, they concluded, could be made permanent — and one day, in Berlin, perhaps the border could be sealed completely. We will come to the wall they built with that conclusion.