The Long Shadow
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Chapter 08

The Cold War in the Colonies

1948–1967  ·  approx. 8 min listen

Here is a part of Britain's Cold War that the standard histories often leave in a side room, and it should not be in a side room, because for millions of people it was the main event. While the great powers played their chess game over Europe, the Cold War was also fought in rubber plantations, in forest reserves, in port cities and oilfields across Britain's dying empire. Sometimes the Cold War drove the end of empire; sometimes the empire was the weapon of the Cold War; and sometimes — this is the murkiest part — the two became so tangled that no one, including the people on the ground, could tell which war they were fighting.

Begin in Malaya, because it was Britain's one clear counter-insurgency victory, and because the template matters.

In June 1948 — the same month the Berlin Blockade began; the Cold War was synchronised like that — communist guerrillas of the Malayan Communist Party launched an armed revolt against British rule. The Malayan Emergency, as it was euphemistically called — for insurance reasons, believe it or not, since London's rubber and tin companies could not claim for losses in a war — lasted twelve years. The guerrillas were drawn overwhelmingly from Malaya's ethnic Chinese minority, hardened veterans of the anti-Japanese resistance Britain itself had armed during the war, which added a certain irony. The stakes were not small: Malaya's rubber and tin were the biggest dollar-earners of the whole sterling area — in cold financial terms, more valuable to post-war Britain than most of the rest of the empire put together. Lose Malaya, the Treasury reckoned, and you might lose the pound.

The early British campaign was a failure — blunt, brutal, ineffective. The turning point came with a new approach, associated above all with General Sir Gerald Templer, who arrived in 1952 as both High Commissioner and military supremo, holding civil and military power in one pair of hands. Templer's method is remembered in two phrases. The first: "The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people." Hearts and minds — the phrase that launched a thousand counter-insurgency manuals — comes from Malaya. The second phrase is less charming: "New Villages." Half a million ethnic Chinese villagers were forcibly resettled into guarded, fenced settlements, cut off from the guerrillas they might feed and inform for — a harsh, massive social-engineering project that worked militarily and is argued about morally to this day. Independence was promised and delivered — Malaya became independent in 1957, with the war still on — which stripped the revolt of its central claim. The Emergency dribbled to an end in 1960. It became the textbook case, taught for decades, of how to beat a communist insurgency: isolate the guerrilla, protect the population, hold elections, leave. The Americans, tragically, read the textbook in Vietnam and discovered that the exam questions were different.

Kenya was uglier. The Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s — a revolt of the Kikuyu people against land theft and settler rule — was portrayed in London as the return of savagery; it was in fact a war of the dispossessed, and it was put down with a ferocity that Britain spent half a century trying not to remember: a state of emergency, mass detention, a system of camps through which most of the Kikuyu population passed, torture, castration, killings — and, at Hola Camp in 1959, eleven prisoners beaten to death by their guards, an atrocity that finally broke the official silence in the House of Commons. The Cold War frame — Mau Mau as communist-inspired — was largely false; Moscow had almost nothing to do with it. But the frame was useful, and it was used. Kenya became independent in 1963 under Jomo Kenyatta, the man the British had imprisoned as the movement's supposed mastermind. The full documentary record of the camp system — hidden for decades in a secret archive at Hanslope Park — only surfaced in the twenty-first century, when elderly Kenyan survivors sued the British government, and won an apology and compensation in 2013. The Cold War in the colonies left paperwork, and the paperwork eventually comes out. That is one of this book's recurring morals.

Cyprus, Aden, the Gulf, Singapore — the pattern repeats with variations. In Cyprus, Britain fought the EOKA insurgency through the fifties, not because Cyprus was communist but because it was a base — the listening posts and airfields from which Britain watched the Middle East and, not incidentally, flew the U-2 spy plane missions we'll come to. In Aden and the Gulf, the Cold War came dressed as Arab nationalism: Nasser's voice on the radio, and after him, in South Yemen, a genuine Marxist regime on the Arabian peninsula by 1967. In Singapore, Britain built its great east-of-Suez base. And through all of it ran the same calculation: what does the empire cost, what does it earn, and — the new question of the age — does holding it help or hurt in the contest with Moscow?

The answer, increasingly, was that it hurt. Colonial wars were expensive, and colonial repression was a propaganda gift. Every photograph of a British soldier kicking in a door in Nairobi or Nicosia was a leaflet for Radio Moscow. Harold Macmillan — Eden's successor, about whom much more shortly — commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of empire, the famous "profit and loss account," and its conclusion was unsentimental: the colonies cost more than they earned, and the Cold War was better fought with allies than with subjects. In February 1960, standing before the South African parliament in Cape Town, Macmillan announced: "The wind of change is blowing through this continent." Within four years, most of British Africa was independent.

Did the Cold War speed decolonisation or slow it? Both. Fear of communism made Britain fight for Malaya and Cyprus; fear of losing the propaganda war made it leave Ghana and Nigeria with flags and handshakes; pressure from Washington — anti-colonial in principle, alliance-minded in practice — pushed both ways, often in the same month. The empire did not end because of the Cold War; it ended because its time was up and its money was gone. But the Cold War chose the soundtrack, and often the timetable.

One more imperial story, because it is the strangest. In 1963, the new state of Indonesia, under the erratic President Sukarno, launched a guerrilla war against the new Federation of Malaysia — which Britain had stitched together partly as an anti-communist bulwark. Britain responded with a secret war — the Confrontation, fought in the jungles of Borneo by British, Gurkha, Australian and New Zealand forces — and won it, so quietly and so cheaply that almost nobody noticed. It is the least-known successful British campaign of the entire Cold War, and the soldiers who fought it came home to no medals and no headlines, because the government had decided, correctly, that the way to win was to keep it small and keep it boring. There is a lesson in there somewhere about the wars that go well.