Supermac and the Skybolt Crisis
Harold Macmillan, who replaced the broken Eden in January 1957, was the most theatrical prime minister of the century — a performance of Edwardian languor concealing a ruthless, clever, deeply read political mind. He had been wounded five times in the Great War and carried the limp and the memory all his life; he had been Churchill's man in North Africa; he affected the air of a duke's uncle who had wandered into politics between shoots. Beneath it, he saw his situation exactly. Britain, he understood, could no longer afford to be a first-class power — but it could still behave like one, and in international politics, behaving like one is most of the trick. His premiership, from 1957 to 1963, was a sustained act of strategic repair, and its central project was the restoration of the special relationship after Suez.
The instrument of the repair was, once again, nuclear.
Macmillan's first achievement was the McMahon Act amendment of 1958 — the restoration of full Anglo-American nuclear cooperation, which we met in Chapter Four. His second was basing: in 1958, sixty American Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles were deployed on RAF bases in eastern England, under a "dual key" arrangement — American warheads, British rockets, both nations' consent required to fire. They made eastern England, for four years, one of the prime targets of the Soviet rocket forces, a fact of which the inhabitants of Norfolk and Yorkshire were dimly aware and about which they were not consulted. It was the first time foreign nuclear missiles had been stationed on British soil, and it set a precedent that would return, with far greater fury, in the 1980s, at a place called Greenham Common.
Macmillan's third nuclear project was the one that defined him, and it was called Blue Streak. Britain, having built the bomb, needed a way to deliver it, and the V-bombers — the beautiful, delta-winged Valiants, Victors and Vulcans that were the pride of the RAF — were going to become obsolete as Soviet air defences improved. Blue Streak was to be Britain's own ballistic missile, a home-built rocket that would guarantee the independent deterrent into the missile age. It consumed money by the hundred million. And in 1960, it was cancelled — too slow, too vulnerable, too liquid-fuelled, too expensive. In its place, the Americans offered a wonder-weapon still on the drawing board: Skybolt, an air-launched ballistic missile that the V-bombers could carry. Macmillan agreed. Britain's entire nuclear future was now bet on an American rocket that did not yet exist.
You can probably guess what happened. In December 1962, the Kennedy administration — whose Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, had come to regard Skybolt as a technical turkey — cancelled it. And here is the delicious irony that historians savour: McNamara offered, quite reasonably, alternatives, and could not understand why London reacted as if the sky were falling. But for Macmillan, Skybolt was not a weapon; it was the entire architecture of British status. No Skybolt meant no independent deterrent in the 1970s. No deterrent meant no seat at the top table. The British press, fed by the government, howled betrayal. Suez, it was said, was happening again — this time by memorandum.
The rescue came at a summit in Nassau, in the Bahamas, days before Christmas 1962. Macmillan deployed on Kennedy every weapon in the armoury — personal friendship, wartime comradeship, family connection (his wife's niece had married Kennedy's late brother-in-law; the families were entangled), and a carefully calibrated performance of wounded dignity. Kennedy, who had not fully realised what Skybolt meant politically, found himself offering what his own State Department regarded as alarmingly generous: Polaris. America's submarine-launched ballistic missile — the real thing, the backbone of the American deterrent itself — sold to Britain, with British warheads, in British-built submarines, assigned to NATO but available, in the agreement's famous escape clause, when "supreme national interests are at stake."
The Nassau Agreement of December 1962 fixed the shape of British nuclear policy for the rest of the century and beyond. The submarines — the Resolution class — were built in Barrow-in-Furness; the missiles came from America; the warheads were British; and from 1969 until today, without a single day's interruption, a British ballistic-missile submarine has been on patrol somewhere in the ocean, letters of last resort from the Prime Minister in the captain's safe, the whole arrangement known as the Continuous At-Sea Deterrent. Whatever you think of nuclear weapons — and this book takes no side — as a piece of statecraft, Nassau was Macmillan's masterpiece. From the wreckage of Blue Streak and the betrayal of Skybolt, he emerged with the most survivable, most credible deterrent Britain could possibly have had, at a price the Treasury could almost afford. "Supermac," the cartoonists called him, and for once the nickname was earned.
Two other events of the Macmillan years belong in this chapter, because they bracket the age.
The first is the test ban. Macmillan had wanted, for years, a treaty banning nuclear tests — partly for principle, partly for prestige, partly because he understood, better than most of his contemporaries, the thermonuclear arithmetic. He worked at it through summit after summit, through the U-2 crisis of May 1960 — when the Soviets shot down an American spy plane, piloted by Gary Powers, that had taken off from Pakistan and was meant to land in Norway; the wreckage of the Paris summit collapsed with the aircraft, and Macmillan, who had staked everything on it, was privately shattered — through Berlin crises and the brinksmanship of October 1962. And in August 1963, it came: the Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. It was the first arms control treaty of the nuclear age. Britain was a co-author and a co-sponsor, and Macmillan regarded it as the crown of his career. Note the triangle: three signatories. In the architecture of arms control, as in so much else, Britain had contrived to be the third chair at a table for two superpowers. That chair is, in a sense, the whole story of this book.
The second event is the Cuban Missile Crisis itself, and Britain's role in it, because it is at once smaller and stranger than myth suggests. For thirteen days in October 1962, the world stood closer to nuclear war than at any time before or since. Britain's contribution was real but marginal: intelligence — Penkovsky's, above all, the product of the Anglo-American operation we met in Chapter Five; the quiet readiness of the RAF's V-bomber force, brought discreetly to alert; and Macmillan's steady private advice to Kennedy, delivered on the telephone in the small hours, urging firmness without provocation. There is a famous photograph of the Cabinet room in those days, and a famous absence: Britain was informed, closely, but not consulted as an equal. The crisis was a superpower duel. Britain's role was to hold the American's coat and steady his arm — and to know, with the intimacy of the UKUSA intelligence machine, exactly how close the edge was. Later it emerged how close: Soviet submarines off Cuba carried nuclear torpedoes; on one of them, with depth charges bursting around it, the captain ordered the torpedo readied, and only the flotilla commander, Vasili Arkhipov, talked him down. One man's veto. That is how close. The RAF crews at their dispersal pans in Lincolnshire that October never knew.
Macmillan's premiership ended, in October 1963, in a fog of illness and scandal. The illness was a prostate operation he mistakenly believed was fatal. The scandal was Profumo.
John Profumo was the Secretary of State for War — a rising, respectable, married minister. Christine Keeler was a nineteen-year-old model. Their affair, in 1961, would have been a private matter but for one detail: at the same time, at the same house parties at Cliveden, Keeler was also involved with Yevgeny Ivanov, the Soviet naval attaché in London — who was, as MI5 knew, an intelligence officer. Sex and the KGB in the same bed: the security services' nightmare, the tabloids' dream. There was, in truth, probably no espionage — Ivanov was recalled to Moscow, and the security damage was nil. But Profumo, asked in the House of Commons, lied. He lied with total conviction, in a personal statement, to the Mother of Parliaments, and for three months the lie held. When it collapsed, in June 1963, it took him down, and it mortally wounded the government. The image that survives — the establishment minister, the call girl, the Russian spy — fixed itself in the world's imagination as the portrait of a decadent, decaying Britain, governed by liars and infiltrated by Moscow. It was grotesquely unfair as a general proposition. It was also, in the year of Philby's defection, entirely believable. That was the damage.
Macmillan resigned that autumn. His last act of political management — the conjuring of the fourteenth Earl of Home into Downing Street, a hereditary peer who renounced his title to become Sir Alec Douglas-Home — confirmed the sense of an era ending in farce. In October 1964, after thirteen years of Conservative rule, Labour returned to power under Harold Wilson.
And the Sixties — the real, ragged, spy-haunted, economically desperate British Sixties — began in earnest.