The Sixties: Spy Fever and Sterling
Harold Wilson arrived in Downing Street in October 1964 promising the "white heat of technology" — a Britain modernised, meritocratic, classless, shaking off the dust of the grouse moor. It was a brilliant election phrase. The problem was that Britain's real burning issue in 1964 was not technology. It was money. It was always money.
The Wilson years, 1964 to 1970, are a study in how the Cold War looked from a country whose creditors kept calling. The pattern was set within weeks. Labour inherited a balance-of-payments crisis — an eight-hundred-million-pound deficit — and spent three years refusing to devalue the pound, because the pound, like the bomb, was a symbol of standing. The defence reviews came one after another, each one cutting: the TSR-2 strike aircraft, a world-beating British design, cancelled in 1965 at a cost of hundreds of millions spent and thousands of jobs — a wound the aircraft industry never forgot; the aircraft carriers, cancelled in 1966; and finally, in January 1968, the announcement that marked the true end of an era: Britain would withdraw from all its bases east of Suez — Singapore, Malaysia, the Gulf, Aden — by 1971. Three hundred years of global military presence, wound up in a single defence white paper. The Royal Navy that had policed the oceans would become, henceforth, a North Atlantic navy. The logic was Cold War logic, in its way: if Britain's fight was the central front in Europe and the nuclear deterrent, then everything else was luxury. But nobody who watched the last troops leave Singapore, or the chaotic, bloody scuttle out of Aden in November 1967 — Britain's last colonial war, fought against a Marxist front that took South Yemen into Moscow's orbit — mistook it for anything but retreat.
And through it all, the pound. In November 1967, the government finally devalued, from two dollars eighty to two dollars forty. Wilson went on television and uttered the most mocked sentence of his career: "It does not mean that the pound here in Britain, in your pocket or purse or in your bank, has been devalued." The pound in your pocket. Everyone knew it was nonsense; the phrase stuck to him forever. Britain's finances were now so weak that, in a detail the official histories make vivid, the Americans were effectively underwriting sterling — and the price, never quite stated, never quite denied, was political. When President Johnson pressed Wilson for even a token British force in Vietnam — a brigade, a battalion, a bagpipe band, the joke went — Wilson refused. It was the most consequential refusal of his premiership, and one of the bravest things a post-war British government did: the first time since the war that Britain flatly declined to join an American war. Washington was icily furious. Australia sent troops; Britain sent a police training team and words. The special relationship survived, as it always did — but everyone noticed that the junior partner had just discovered the word no. It would not be the last time, but the next refusal would come from the other side.
Underneath the Wilson government ran the strangest current of the whole Cold War: spy fever.
The Philby defection of 1963 had opened the wound, and through the sixties it never closed. The roll of revelations reads like fiction. In 1961, George Blake — an MI6 officer who had been a Soviet agent for a decade, betraying, by MI6's own estimate, hundreds of agents behind the Iron Curtain — was sentenced to forty-two years in prison, the longest sentence in modern British legal history. In 1966, he escaped from Wormwood Scrubs — over the wall with a rope ladder made of knitting needles and twine, smuggled out of the country in a camper van, and into Moscow, where he lived until 2020. The escape was so improbable that many suspected inside help; the truth, it turned out, was ordinary criminals and idealistic amateurs, which was somehow worse. In 1962, John Vassall, an admiralty clerk, was unmasked as a Soviet agent — blackmailed over photographs taken during his posting to Moscow. In 1961, the Portland spy ring — Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, and the KGB illegals Konon Molody, posing as a Canadian businessman named Gordon Lonsdale, and the Krogers, posing as harmless New Zealand antiquarian booksellers in Ruislip — was rolled up after a tip from a Polish defector. They had been stealing the secrets of Britain's nuclear submarines and underwater detection systems from the naval base at Portland. The Krogers' bungalow, when it was searched, yielded one-time pads, microdots, and radio equipment hidden in a cigarette lighter and a talcum powder tin. Ruislip. The sheer suburban banality of it — the KGB running its British network from a bungalow between the launderette and the bus stop — did something profound to the British imagination. The enemy was not at the gate. The enemy was in the semi-detached next door, asking about your allotment.
And then there were the defectors coming the other way, who told Britain things it did not entirely want to hear. Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB major who defected in 1961, brought warnings of Soviet penetration so sweeping — and accusations so wild — that he half-maddened every service that debriefed him. And in September 1985 — we will get there — Oleg Gordievsky would bring the truth, and vindicate some of the fever. But in the sixties, the fever raged untreated. MI5 investigated its own Director General. Officers privately suspected — there is no other word for it — their own Prime Minister. The rumours about Harold Wilson and the KGB have been examined by every serious historian who has touched them and found to be essentially baseless; but the fact that serving intelligence officers could entertain them, could plot — in the case of the clockwork, reactionary fantasist Peter Wright and a handful of others — against an elected government, tells you where the spy scandals had led. The English gentleman's conspiracy had been replaced by an English gentleman's paranoia. Neither was a good operating system for a democracy.
The cultural fallout was more productive. Out of the wreckage of Philby and Blake came the greatest spy fiction ever written. John le Carré — himself a former MI5 and MI6 man, whose real name was David Cornwell, and whose career in the service was ended by Philby's betrayal, which blew his agents — published The Spy Who Came in from the Cold in 1963, and reinvented the genre. Against Ian Fleming's James Bond — all martinis and gadgets, a fantasy of the power Britain wished it still had — le Carré set George Smiley: grey, cuckolded, brilliant, bureaucratic, a spy as civil servant, fighting a war of files and interrogations in which both sides, as the novels kept insisting, were morally fungible. "What do you think spies are?" asks Alec Leamas, the burnt-out hero of that novel. "They are a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives." Britain could no longer write Bond with a straight face. It wrote Smiley instead. That, too, was a verdict on the times.
One August night in 1968, the verdict came due in Europe. The Prague Spring — Alexander Dubček's attempt to build "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia — had flowered all summer, and the whole of the West had watched it with hope and dread. On the night of the twentieth of August, the armies of five Warsaw Pact countries invaded. Half a million troops. The experiment was crushed in a week. In London, as everywhere in the West, there was outrage, protest, and — the old, familiar, bitter arithmetic — no thought of intervention. Czechoslovakia, like Hungary, like East Germany, was east of the line, and the line was nuclear. What the invasion did change was minds. Across Western Europe, a generation of left-wing intellectuals who had kept some sympathy for Moscow finally let go of it. In Britain, the Communist Party of Great Britain — which had condemned the invasion — began its long decline into irrelevance and, eventually, dissolution. The Cold War would go on for twenty more years, but after Prague, fewer and fewer people in the West believed the Soviet project had a soul left to save.