The Long Shadow
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Chapter 11

The Seventies: Détente and the Brink of the Abyss

1970–1979  ·  approx. 8 min listen

The nineteen-seventies in Britain have an official soundtrack in the national memory: strikes, blackouts, glam rock, and failure. The decade of the three-day week, of rubbish piled in Leicester Square, of the IMF, of a country that seemed to be breaking down. All true. But seen from the Cold War angle — and that is our angle — the seventies were also the decade of détente, the great relaxation, and Britain's role in it was quiet, complicated, and more honourable than the decade's reputation suggests.

Détente had a logic imposed by the arithmetic of terror. By 1969 the Soviet Union had reached rough nuclear parity with the United States. Both sides now had enough warheads to destroy each other many times over, and both knew it — the acronym was MAD, mutually assured destruction, and it was intended to be exactly what it sounded like. If war was unwinnable, then the competition had to be managed, and management meant treaties. The superpowers duly produced them: the Salt One agreement of 1972, limiting missile numbers; the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the intellectual jewel of the whole edifice, which said, in effect, that each side would leave itself defenceless so that neither would dare shoot first. Arms control is the strangest intellectual construction of the modern age — the systematic, lawyerly, treaty-bound management of the end of the world — and Britain was in it up to the elbows: the test ban of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, of which Britain was a co-depositary with the two superpowers, the endless expert negotiations in Geneva where British diplomats were prized as draftsmen and fixers. The third chair again. Always the third chair.

The British contribution to détente, though, was not only drafting. It was also experience — the memory of how the Cold War had actually been lived. When Willy Brandt, the West German chancellor, launched Ostpolitik — the opening to the East, treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, recognition of the German Democratic Republic — it was controversial everywhere, and in Britain it was watched with a wary respect. London had its own version, smaller but real: trade agreements, cultural exchanges, a cautious thaw. And in 1975 came the summit of the whole process, the Helsinki Final Act — thirty-five nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and every European country except Albania, signing a declaration that confirmed Europe's post-war borders as inviolable and, in Basket Three, committed all signatories to human rights, to the free movement of people and ideas.

At the time, Helsinki was widely dismissed in the West as a sell-out — borders recognised, the Iron Curtain legitimised, and the human rights clauses so much paper. The Soviets thought so too; they wanted the borders and assumed the rights were decoration. They were wrong, and it was one of the great miscalculations of the Cold War. The Helsinki clauses gave the dissidents of Eastern Europe a standard to appeal to — a document their own governments had signed. The Helsinki monitoring groups that sprang up in Moscow, in Prague, in Warsaw — Charter 77, the Moscow Helsinki Group — became the thin end of the wedge that, within fifteen years, split the whole communist structure. Václav Havel went to prison citing Helsinki; Solidarity cited it; Sakharov cited it. The British diplomats who had laboured over the drafting of Basket Three — fighting for every comma on family reunification and journalistic access — had built, without quite knowing it, one of the instruments of the Cold War's end. Sometimes the pen really was mightier, though the missile, admittedly, kept the pen's office open.

But détente at the summit level coexisted, in Britain, with a domestic cold war that was turning vicious — and this is the part of the seventies that fits least comfortably into patriotic memory, so let us look at it squarely.

The Wilson governments of the seventies — Wilson back in power from 1974 to 1976, then James Callaghan to 1979 — governed a country in visible decline. Inflation hit twenty-five percent. The pound slid. In 1976, Britain became the first major Western country since the war to go, cap in hand, to the International Monetary Fund for a bailout — Callaghan's humiliating, necessary loan, with its public-spending cuts dictated from Washington, Suez rendered as an economics lesson. A cold war requires a functioning economy, and Britain's was failing. The Americans, allies though they were, noted it coldly; there is a chilling little episode from 1974 in which American officials, reviewing contingency plans, asked themselves at what point Britain's economic collapse might require the United States to reconsider its intelligence-sharing. The relationship held. But the question had been asked.

At home, the security state expanded in ways that would have horrified the Attlee government. MI5, swollen by the spy fever, devoted enormous resources to watching the domestic left: trade unionists, CND members, Labour MPs, the Communist Party's declining membership, journalists, academics — files upon files, phone taps, mail intercepts, agents in the universities and the unions. Some of it was defensible: the KGB and its East European allies really did run operations in Britain, really did cultivate contacts, really did fund front organisations — the Czech intelligence officer Josef Frolík, who defected in 1969, and the KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, whose notes emerged in the nineties, both documented real penetration, real agents of influence, real money changing hands. But the net caught far more than spies. The line between counter-subversion and political policing blurred, and for many on the British left, the lesson of the seventies was that the security services regarded them, not the KGB, as the enemy. That grievance — fanned by Peter Wright's mendacious, lucrative memoir Spycatcher in the eighties, which the Thatcher government tried, ludicrously, to ban, thereby guaranteeing it the bestseller lists — poisoned trust in the secret state for a generation, and the residue has never entirely washed out.

And then there was Northern Ireland, where the Cold War's local logic — insurgency, counter-insurgency, intelligence war, propaganda war — played out for thirty years on British soil, with British troops in British streets, and with the Soviet Union watching, needling, and occasionally funding. The Troubles were not a Cold War conflict, and this book will not pretend otherwise; their roots were centuries deep. But the techniques were the techniques of the era: infiltration, informers, black propaganda, interrogation in depth. If you want to see what Britain's Cold War methods looked like when brought home, look at Belfast. It is not a comfortable mirror.

The decade ended with the two events that would close it and open the next. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan — the end of détente, though no one used the word's past tense quite yet. And seven months earlier, in May 1979, Britain had elected Margaret Thatcher.

The détente decade was over. The Iron Lady was in Downing Street. And the Cold War was about to get colder than it had been in twenty years.