The Second Cold War
Historians call the period from 1979 to about 1985 the Second Cold War, and it is not a metaphor. By 1983, the world was as close to nuclear war as it had been since Cuba, and much of the British public knew it and was in the streets about it. It is the period when Britain — broke, strike-torn, supposedly finished — suddenly mattered again at the centre of the superpower contest. And the reason, above all, was the woman who gave her name to the age.
Margaret Thatcher's relationship with the Cold War was not a policy; it was a creed. She had hated communism since before it was fashionable to hate it, and she said so with a clarity that scandalised the Foreign Office and electrified the Soviet leadership. In January 1976, as Leader of the Opposition, she had given a speech warning that the Russians were "bent on world dominance," that they put guns before butter while "we put just about everything before guns." The Soviet Army newspaper Red Star responded with an insult that backfired spectacularly: it called her the Iron Lady. She adopted it instantly. By the time she won the 1979 election, Moscow knew exactly who she was, and the feeling was mutual.
Her first years coincided with a hardening everywhere. In America, Ronald Reagan — elected in November 1980 — arrived determined to roll back what he called the "evil empire," a phrase he would actually use, in 1983, to the horror of diplomatic opinion and the delight of the dissidents behind the curtain, who heard it on the BBC and Radio Liberty and could not believe an American president had finally said it. In Moscow, an aged, paranoid leadership — Brezhnev dying, then Andropov, the former KGB chief, himself dying — read the Western rhetoric through the lens of their own fears. And in Europe, the issue that would dominate the decade was being decided: the Euromissiles.
The Euromissile crisis needs a paragraph of explanation, because it was the engine of everything that followed. In 1977, the Soviet Union began deploying a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20 — mobile, accurate, carrying three warheads, aimed at the cities of Western Europe. It could not reach America, and that was the point: it decoupled Europe from the American deterrent. Why, the strategists asked, would an American president risk Chicago to save Coventry? NATO's answer, agreed in December 1979, was the "dual track" decision: negotiate the missiles away if possible — and if not, deploy NATO's own intermediate missiles in Europe: American cruise missiles and Pershing Twos, based in five countries.
Britain's share of that decision was a hundred and sixty ground-launched cruise missiles, and the main base was RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire.
The decision to accept them had actually been taken by the Callaghan Labour government — one of history's ironies, given what followed — but it fell to Thatcher's government to implement it, and to her Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, to sell it. They sold it into a firestorm. Because Britain in the early eighties experienced the greatest wave of nuclear protest in its history, and Greenham Common became its symbol and its battleground.
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament — CND — was not new. It had been founded in 1958, in the wake of the H-bomb tests, and its great marches from the Aldermaston weapons factory to London in the late fifties and early sixties had been a defining spectacle of that era: tens of thousands walking through the Berkshire lanes in the Easter rain, behind banners and jazz bands, Bertrand Russell — the greatest philosopher of the age, imprisoned for his part in the sit-downs, at the age of eighty-nine — giving it an intellectual gravity that rattled the government. But by the seventies CND had dwindled to a remnant. The Euromissiles resurrected it. By 1983, its membership had multiplied tenfold and beyond; its demonstrations filled central London; the debate over unilateral disarmament — should Britain give up its own nuclear weapons regardless of what others did? — split the Labour Party down its ancient fault line and became, arguably, the decisive issue of the 1983 general election.
And then there were the women of Greenham Common.
In September 1981, a small group of women — "Women for Life on Earth" — walked from Cardiff to Greenham Common to protest the cruise missiles, and when nobody listened, they stayed. They chained themselves to the fence. They were evicted; they came back. In December 1982, thirty thousand women joined hands around the base — "Embrace the Base." They danced on the missile silos at dawn. They cut the fences, again and again, in the face of soldiers, police, bailiffs, and the courts. They were mocked, patronised, arrested by the thousand, and smeared — including, shamefully, by elements of the security services and the press — as KGB dupes. They were nothing of the kind, and the smears said more about the smearers. The Greenham Women's Peace Camp lasted, in one form or another, for nineteen years — long after the missiles it opposed had come, and gone. Whatever one thinks of the politics, it was one of the most remarkable sustained acts of civil disobedience in British history, and it was a genuinely new thing: a mass, feminist, leaderless confrontation with the nuclear state, fought with weaving and song and bolt-cutters on a Berkshire common.
The government, for its part, fought the protest war with everything it had: an advertising campaign, ministerial tours, secret propaganda units — the old IRD techniques, revived — and, it later emerged, MI5 surveillance of CND's leadership, one of whose officers, Cathy Massiter, resigned and blew the whistle on national television in 1985. The secret state was watching the peace movement, in other words, at exactly the moment when, in deepest secrecy, the real drama of the Cold War's endgame was beginning — in the KGB's own London station.
Because here is the extraordinary thing. While the missiles were being argued over in public, the intelligence war was being won in private — and the decisive agent of the entire late Cold War was a KGB colonel working for Britain.
Oleg Gordievsky was the KGB's man in London — eventually, the head of its London residency — and since 1974, he had been working for MI6. His motives were ideological: he had been disillusioned by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and he had concluded that the system he served was a lie. For eleven years, in Copenhagen and then in London, he gave the West something it had never had: a senior KGB officer explaining, from the inside, how the Soviet leadership actually thought. And what he reported, in 1983, was terrifying.
The Soviet leadership, Gordievsky revealed, genuinely believed the West might be preparing a nuclear first strike. Andropov, the KGB chief turned General Secretary, had ordered a global intelligence operation — Operation Ryan — to watch for the signs: lights burning late in Western ministries, blood bank stockpiles, the movement of officials' families. It sounds paranoid. It was paranoid. But the paranoia was armed with forty thousand warheads. And in November 1983, NATO ran a command-post exercise called Able Archer eighty-three — a rehearsal of nuclear war so realistic, involving such realistic procedures, that Moscow read it as possible cover for the real thing. For several days, Soviet nuclear forces went to a heightened alert. The West had no idea. When Gordievsky's reporting reached Washington and London — and it did reach them, fast, because MI6 understood exactly what it had — the effect was profound. Reagan, by his own later account, was shaken: the Soviets had really believed it. The NATO exercise that nearly ended the world became one of the forces pushing the American president toward negotiation.
Gordievsky's other contribution was subtler and, in the long run, just as important. In 1984, a Soviet politician named Mikhail Gorbachev was due to visit Britain. He was the coming man — everyone could see it — and the visit would be Thatcher's first look at him. Gordievsky briefed both sides. He told MI6 what Gorbachev wanted to discuss and how to handle him; and, being the KGB's man preparing the visit, he told the Soviet side what Thatcher would raise. He was, in effect, scripting both ends of the most consequential diplomatic encounter of the decade. When Gorbachev came to Chequers in December 1984, the chemistry was real and immediate. Thatcher emerged and said the sentence that went around the world: "I like Mr Gorbachev. We can do business together."
Think about that sentence. It was December 1984 — the cold of the Second Cold War, missiles deployed at Greenham, Andropov barely buried, Reagan in full rhetorical cry. And the most anti-communist leader in the Western world had just told the planet that the next Soviet leader was a man she could work with. The Americans noticed — and were slightly alarmed. The Soviets noticed — and drew their own conclusion about Gorbachev's standing. The dissidents noticed. Three months later, Chernenko was dead, and Gorbachev was General Secretary.
And in the summer of 1985, Gordievsky's world collapsed. Recalled to Moscow — betrayed, almost certainly, by the CIA's own mole, Aldrich Ames, though Ames was never charged with it — he was drugged and interrogated and realised he was blown. What followed reads like fiction but is documented fact: MI6 activated an escape plan, codenamed Pimlico, that had been prepared for years. Under the noses of the KGB, in a forest lay-by near the Finnish border, Gordievsky was bundled into the boot of a diplomatic car and smuggled out of the Soviet Union — the only Soviet intelligence officer ever to be exfiltrated from the USSR by the West during the Cold War. There is a famous detail: as the cars passed through the border checkpoint, the Alsatian dogs came sniffing, and an MI6 officer's wife — in the back of the car with her baby — changed the child's nappy on the boot lid, directly over the hidden man, and dropped cheese and onion crisps for the dogs. The dogs lost interest. The car rolled on into Finland. The Cold War was won, in part, with a nappy and a packet of crisps. You could not put it in a novel.
Gordievsky's wife and daughters were left behind; it took six years of diplomatic pressure, and the intervention of Thatcher and Bush personally, to get them out. He lives in England still, under guard; Moscow has never forgiven him, and after the Salisbury poisoning of 2018, his caution was shown to be entirely rational. But that is another Cold War — the one that came after. We are not done with the first.